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The defendants respectfully submit this brief in objection
to plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the questions presented by petitioner are of the

character and scope necessary to be considered by the Utah
Supreme Court on Certiorari or whether they are unique to this
case and fact specific, thus not entitling petitioner to a Writ
of Certiorari under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.
2.
(a)

Is an expert witness a surprise witness where:
The expert withdraws as a witness because he perceives

plaintiff's conduct as threatening his personal safety as well as
the safety of his family; (b)

After reassessing this risk, the

expert changes his mind and agrees to testify, and notice is
given to opposing counsel within ten days prior to trial as
agreed by the parties and ordered by the court in the pretrial
order; (c)

A written report is prepared and delivered to

plaintiff's counsel as requested by counsel during the hearing on
the Motion in Limine and ordered by the court; (d)

No objection

was made by plaintiff's counsel when the expert is called to
testify; (e)

Plaintiff's counsel conducts an extensive cross

examination in an area in which he is personally familiar; and
(f)

The expert is called to testify 22 days after plaintiff's

counsel is given notice.
3.

If the above-described expert is a surprise witness, did

the decision by the Court of Appeals in this matter nullify or
damage the Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of discovery to

allow parties to spring surprise witnesses on opposing counsel
immediately prior to trial and thereby prejudice opposing
parties?
4.

Do the facts of this case and its disposition at the

Court of Appeals support plaintiff's attempt to have this Court
modify the waiver doctrine?
CONTROLLING STATUTES
The controlling statutes are attached in the Addendum to
this Brief as exhibit "A" and by reference made a part hereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal
injuries resulting from a two-vehicle accident which occurred on
June 15, 1984. Plaintiff alleged he suffered a "closed head
brain injury" and a low back injury.

The plaintiff was seeking

damages in the amount of $1,152,498.79.

(R. 145)

The action was the subject of a jury trial on February 2nd
to February 17, 1987. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
plaintiff finding that the defendant Bates was 75% at fault in
the causing of the accident and determining that plaintiff had
suffered damages totaling $16,850.00. The damages awarded to
plaintiff were reduced by 25% by reason of the negligence
attributed to plaintiff by the jury.

(R. 658-660)

Plaintiff's motions for a new trial or for an additur were
denied by the trial court.

(R. 715)

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment on the jury verdict and
from the order denying the motion for a new trial or for additur.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The court reversed the special verdict attributing 25% of the
total negligence to the plaintiff, finding that the evidence did
not support such a finding, and remanded the case for entry of
judgment consistent therewith.

(The case is reported at Onyeabor

v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990)).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court on all other
issues.

First, it rejected plaintiff's claim of judicial bias,

finding as follows:

1) that the plaintiff never filed an

affidavit as required by Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;

2) that the plaintiff failed to make contemporaneous

objections to the court's comments.

The Court of Appeals pointed

out that, while reluctance to make frequent objections is
understandable, the court could not find even one such
contemporaneous objection on the record;
not file a motion for a mistrial; and

3) that plaintiff did

4) that there was nothing

to contradict the defendants' observations that the judge's
remarks at issue were simply explanatory and for the purposes of
clarification.

(Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 526-28.)

Second, the Court of Appeals decided that the plaintiff's
claim that Dr. Clark was a surprise witness was without merit,
finding that Dr. Clark had been identified 12 days before trial,
that plaintiff's counsel was familiar with him, and that the
subject matter and substance of his testimony was contained in a
report delivered to plaintiff as required by the lower court.
The Court of Appeals also found that, even if it was error to
admit his testimony, the plaintiff was not preiudiced therebv.

(Id, at 528-29)
The plaintiff/petitioner, now petitions this Court for Writ
of Certiorari on the issues of judicial bias and the admission of
Dr. Clark's expert testimony.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Comment on the evidence:

In response to petitioner's

assertion in his statement of facts that the judge made numerous
prejudicial comments on the evidence and exhibited a prejudicial
attitude toward the plaintiff and his counsel through the court's
demeanor and conduct of the trial, the defendants assert that the
comments at issue were appropriate and not prejudicial.

Instead,

many of the comments could be characterized as explanatory and
others were made in an attempt to clarify the evidence elicited
and limit it to those things which were relevant to the issues
before the jury.
The latter was especially necessary as the case was tried on
February 2, through February 17, 1987, for a total of 11 trial
days.

During the course of the trial, 33 witnesses testified; 20

of them as experts.

Of the total witnesses, plaintiff called 26,

of whom 15 were experts. Additionally, 108 of 113 offered
exhibits were plaintiff's.
admitted into evidence.

One hundred six exhibits were

Plaintiff's case in chief lasted from

February 2nd until the morning of February 12, 1987. Virtually
all of the testimony and exhibits sought to be admitted by
plaintiff were admitted during the course of trial such that
plaintiff's claims were fully and completely presented to the
jury.

Because the list of plaintiff's specific allegations with

regard to the claimed direct comments is so lengthy, the
defendants have not included their responses to each in the body
of this brief•

Instead, for the Court's convenience and

information, defendants1 specific responses to each of the
allegedly biased comments are included in the Addendum to this
brief as Exhibit "B" and by reference made a part hereof.
Lincoln Clark, M.D, as a Witness:

Defendants1 amended

witness and exhibit list containing Dr. Clark's name was filed
and served on January 21, 1987. The proposed pretrial order
signed by both counsel on November 6, 1986, (R. 228-248) provided
that at least ten days prior to trial, each party would serve
upon opposing counsel a list of all v/itnesses who would or might
be called at trial.

(R. 246) . The order did provide the list

should be mailed at least 13 days prior to trial to insure that
opposing counsel would receive it at least 11 days prior to
trial.

Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receiving that list on

January 22, ten days prior to trial.

(App. brief to the Court of

Appeals pg. 80).
Defendants concede that at a hearing on December 5, 1986,
Dr. Clark stated he would not testify in the action.

At that

hearing, Dr. Clark stated that after examining the plaintiff and
based upon his professional experience, including testimony in
major criminal and in several commitment hearings, the plaintiff
constituted a threat to him, his family, to defendant Bates and
to Dr. Thomas Houts and that Dr. Clark's appearance as a witness
at trial opposing the plaintiff would place himself and his wife
in physical jeopardy (T. S. 4-10; S 13-15).

Subsequent events

caused Dr. Clark to determine that he could appear as a witness
in the case without exposing himself to an unreasonable risk of
harm.

(T. L. 124-29).

Plaintiff's counsel also perceived the

potential risk of harm to Dr. Clark as is indicated by a series
of questions and answers in which Mr. Sykes phoned a warning to
Dr. Clark after receiving a phone call from plaintiff's wife.
(T. L. 132-33).
The plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial,
January 30, 1987.

The judge concluded that if the defendants

provided the plaintiff with a written report, he would permit Dr.
Clark to testify.

(T. Q. 49-50).

A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his
examination and evaluation of the plaintiff was delivered to
plaintiff's counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m.
Plaintiff's counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or
interview Dr. Clark.

No objection was made by the plaintiff when

Dr. Clark was called to testify on February 13, 1987, 22 days
after plaintiff first received notice that Dr. Clark would
testify.
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted a lengthy cross
examination of Dr. Clark.

A review of the transcript (Vol. L.)

reveals the cross examination fills nearly

100 pages (compared

to 44 pages for direct examination) and occupies substantially
all of the afternoon session of February 13, 1987.

During the

course of cross examination, plaintiff's counsel tested the
credibilitv of the witness utilizing Dr. Clark's transcribed

testimony taken during the trial of another closed head brain
injury case in which both plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Clark were
involved.
ARGUMENT
I
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND ITS DISPOSITION ON

APPEAL DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF"S CLAIM THAT
A REVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER IS AN
ISSUE OF SUFFICIENT CHARACTER AND SCOPE TO
WARRANT CERTIORARI
The plaintiff seeks a Writ of Certiorari to review two
issues decided by the Court of Appeals, and he seeks to establish
that they are compelling issues which must be addressed by this
Court as far reaching issues of procedure and policy.

Quite

simply, they are not.
In petitioner's first question presented for review, he
seeks to have this Court reconsider the doctrine of waiver.

He

argues that an attorney should not be required to object to
prejudicial comments and conduct by a trial judge where those
comments and conduct are too numerous and too pervasive so as to
make repeated objections prejudicial to that attorney's case.

In

support of his attempt to have this Court review the doctrine of
waiver, the petitioner cites 35 specific examples of prejudicial
comments by Judge Croft.
The petitioner then argues that the decision by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner's claim of judicial bias was without
merit was an excessively strict, inflexible application of the
doctrine of waiver such as to warrant this Court's review.
The facts and the decision bv the Court of Appeals do not

support petitioner's position.
Each of the specific comments and conduct singled out by the
petitioner here were raised in and reviewed by the Court of
Appeals,

They include:

1) direct comments on the evidence; 2)

sua sponte interjections by the trial judge; and 3) the demeanor
and other non-verbal conduct of the trial judge.

Rather than

address each of these three classes individually and specifically
at this time, the defendants shall limit their response to the
issue of whether the decision by the Court of Appeals warrants
review by this Court and is therefore of the magnitude to warrant
certiorari.

However, included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit

"B" is defendants1 argument addressing each of the plaintiff's
specific allegations as to judicial bias.

To the extent

necessaryf it is incorporated by reference.
The petitioner's arguments as to judicial bias and the
identical comments included by plaintiff in his Tables 1 and II
were reviewed by the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals

dismissed the petitioner's claim of judicial bias as being
without merit.

However, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, this

decision was based on several grounds, and not solely on
plaintiff's failure to object to each.

First, the petitioner

failed to file an affidavit of bias as provided for in Rule 36(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the Court of Appeals

pointed out that this was not the sole infirmity of the
petitioner's claim, it cited the case of Madsen v. Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) for the
principle that motions to disqualify must be made promptly and

may not be delayed so as to appear that they are filed only when
rulings are unfavorable.

The Onyeabor panel of the court quoted

the Madsen case and stated:

"'Not only is such a tactic unfair,

but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not in fact
biased.'"

(Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 527 fn. 1, quoting Madsen, 767

P.2d at 542).
Specifically addressing the petitioner's claim now at issue
before this Utah Supreme Court that counsel should not be
expected to object to every prejudicial comment, the Court of
Appeals noted that the petitioner had in fact objected to none!
The Court of Appeals stated:
Although reluctance to make frequent
objections may be understandable, we fail to
find in the portions of the record provided
by plaintiff even one such contemporaneous
objection. Nor can we find any motion made
by plaintiff for a mistrial.
Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 527.
In the Court of Appeals, as here, the petitioner had relied
on the singular passage on day three of the trial where the trial
judge explained that the petitioner had objected in chambers to
his conduct.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the need to

make a record applies to conferences in chambers as well as
courtroom proceedings and that the burden was the plaintiff's to
preserve the record for a possible appeal.
The Court of Appeals then addressed the lower court's
comments on plaintiff's objection made in chambers, but the Court
of Appeals cited the entire passage.

The entire passage is

important as it includes the trial judge's response to

You have made mention of the fact . . . that
some of your witnesses sitting in the
courtroom told you that it was obvious that
the judge didn't like you. Well, again if
they got that impression, I'm sorry, because
that isn't true. . . .
But you go on in your brief stressing the
fact that my conduct throughout the trial
gave the jury a powerful message that your
methods were time consuming, meaningless,
perhaps an attempt to put something over on
the jury. That surprised me. . . . And you
suggest that my conduct, by the tone of my
voice, by the shrug of my shoulders, by a
sigh, gave a powerful message to the jury
that I didn't think much of your case, and I
was trying to hurry the case along and not
willing to give you a fair shake. . . . The
only way I can respond to that sort of
indictment of the Court's conduct at the
trial is by saying I plead not guilty. . . .
I deny that throughout the trial I did things
intentionally or unintentionally to discredit
you or your witnesses or to the face of the

J ur YId. at 527.

(emphasis added)

Thus the court denied that its

conduct was prejudicial on day three of the trial, and the
petitioner never raised a subsequent objection in the remaining
eight days of trial.
Finally, in dismissing petitioner's claim of judicial bias
as being without merit, the Court of Appeals also relied on the
fact that there was a jury instruction which cautioned the jurors
that anything done or said by the judge during the trial should
not be considered by the jurors as indicating the judge's view on
any issue in the case.

Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 2

stated as follows:
Anything done or said by me during the trial
should not be considered by you as indicating
my view on any issue in this case. Any
belief you may have as to what my view may be

should receive no consideration by you in
your deliberations.
Therefore, the decision that the petitioner's claim was
without merit was based on several grounds and a review of all
comments in context of the entire record.

Not only did the

plaintiff's counsel fail to object to any comments on the record,
he also failed to file an affidavit of prejudice as soon as it
allegedly became apparent that the judge disliked the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's case.

The judge himself addressed

plaintiff's concerns and denied all allegations of bias as well
as instructing the jury to disregard any beliefs they had as to
the judge's opinion of the case.
From the entire record, then, the Court of Appeals could
only conclude that:

"There is nothing to

contradict defendants'

observation that the questioned remarks were 'simply explanatory
statements made by the Court either in the course of ruling on
objections, or limiting the admissibility of evidence or
testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a witness.'"
at 528.
This conclusion and the dismissal of plaintiff's claim of
bias was therefore not an inflexible and overly strict
application of the doctrine of waiver as the petitioner would
argue.

It was, instead, a reasoned approach to the specific

facts of this case and the plaintiff's claims on appeal. As a
result, the plaintiff's claim that this Court must review the
doctrine of waiver is not of the character and scope necessary
for this Court to grant plaintiff's Writ of Certiorari.

It

Id.

II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IN ALLOWING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANTS' EXPERT, DR.
LINCOLN CLARK, M.D.
AS A RESULT, THE
DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS
REGARD DOES NOT LESSEN THE STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE AMONG LITIGATING ATTORNEYS OR AFFECT
THE PERCEIVED FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DR. CLARK WAS
A SURPRISE WITNESS IS NOT OF THE SCOPE AND
CHARACTER NECESSARY FOR CERTIORARI
The petitioner's argument that the decision by the Court of
Appeals sanctioning the lower court's refusal to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark as a surprise witness somehow
lessens the standards of practice among litigating attorneys. To
emphasize his point, the petitioner claims we might as well tear
out certain pages of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the
Court of Appeals is refusing to enforce them.

Hardly.

The issue of exclusion of the testimony of a surprise
witness is a fact-intensive issue on which a trial court has
broad discretion.

A decision will be overturned on appeal only

for clear abuse of that discretion.
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement his response with respect to any
question directly addressed to . . . the
identity of each person expected to be called
as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify,
and the substance of his testimony.
Rule 51(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the trial
court to grant a new trial based on "accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether or

not to exclude testimony or to grant a new trial based on an
alleged surprise witness.

Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443

P.2d 916 (1968); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977) (a
ruling on a motion for a new trial will be overturned only for a
clear abuse of discretion).
In reviewing a trial court's use of such discretion, this
Court has noted that, to overturn a trial court's ruling on a new
trial requires a "clear transgression" of "reasonable bounds of
discretion", and no such transgression exists where there is
evidence to support the ruling.

Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197,

202 (Utah 1981) rev'd on other grounds.

See also, Sturdivant v.

Yale-New Haven Hospital, 476 A.2d at 1077.
Beyond showing an abuse of discretion, the appellant must
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged "surprise" before
the denial of a new trial will be overturned.
P.2d 197.

See, Lembach, 639

See also, Acosta v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 437, 706

P.2d 763 (1985) .
The policy behind such rules is that the disclosure of the
witnesses permits "the opposing party to prepare an effective
cross-examination."

Hoover v. United States Dept. of the

Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980).

Where this policy

is not contravened, a so-called "surprise" witness has been
allowed to testify.

See, Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443

P. 2d 916 (1968) (testimony allowed where appellant was given
opportunity to depose witness prior to testimony).

See

also, Macshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756 (1967),
rev'd on other grounds, Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328

(Utah 1979) (not abuse to permit testimony not disclosed at
pre-trial).
Plaintiff contends that Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist
called to testify on behalf of defendants, was a surprise witness
whose testimony was prejudicial to plaintiff.
Conduct by plaintiff himself which was perceived by an
experienced psychiatrist as threatening caused Dr. Clark to
initially withdraw as an expert witness.

Plaintiff's own counsel

apparently perceived the threat as real as he called Dr. Clark to
warn him of possible violence from plaintiff in an incident where
plaintiff, in fact, appeared at the office of plaintiff's counsel
and banged on counsel's desk with a cane.

After reassessing the

risk to his personal safety, Dr. Clark concluded that he could
appear as a witness.

Plaintiff was informed that Dr. Clark would

be a witness more than ten days prior to trial.

Dr. Clark's

testimony did not occur until February 13, 1987, twenty-two days
after plaintiff's counsel had notice that he would appear.
Plaintiff's motion _in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial,
January 30, 1987.

At that time, Judge Croft indicated that he

was inclined to permit Dr. Clark to testify and stated:
[JUDGE CROFT]: I would say that if, during
the course of the trial, you decide you want
to call Dr. Clark then perhaps an opportunity
for Mr. Sykes to interview him might be
granted.
MR. STEGALL: Okay. I would certainly be
willing to inquire of Dr. Clark as to whether
he could put together a written report prior
to Monday or Tuesday. I don't know how

feasible that is but I will certainly so
inquire and if one can be prepared —
JUDGE CROFT: One might say if he is going to
testify then tell him we want a written
report for the attorneys to have a look at.
MR. SYKES: That's the least we should have,
is a written report.
JUDGE CROFT: So if you want to agree to try
to get together to dictate a report and have
it available to you Monday or Tuesday so you
will both have it then I would say if you
went to call him, why, I would permit him to
do so.
(T. Q49-50.)
A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his
examination and evaluation of plaintiff was delivered to
plaintiff's counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m.
Plaintiff's counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or
interview Dr. Clark.

No objection was made by plaintiff when Dr.

Clark was called to testify on February 13, 1987.
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted an able, aggressive
and lengthy cross-examination of Dr. Clark.

During the course of

cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel tested the credibility of
the witness utilizing Dr. Clark's transcribed testimony taken
during the trial of another closed-head brain injury case in
which both plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Clark were involved.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial
court to exclude Dr. Clark as a witness.

The witness's earlier

withdrawal had been caused by plaintiff's own conduct.

A seven

page single-spaced typed report of the witness' examination and
findings were furnished to plaintiff's counsel substantially in

advance of the witness's testimony.

Plaintiff's counsel had had

the opportunity to test the demeanor, credentials and expertise
of the witness in a prior legal proceeding.

A cross examination

performed by plaintiff's counsel reveals counsel's own
substantial expertise in the field of brain injury which
permitted him to make a full and informative cross-examination of
the witness.
Upon review the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner's
claim that Dr. Clark was a surprise witness was without merit.
The Court of Appeals found that the defendants had substantially
complied with Rule 26(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court pointed out that Dr. Clark was identified twelve days
before trial and that plaintiff's counsel was familiar with him
from his testimony in other lawsuits.

In addition, the Court

noted that the subject matter and substance of the expert
testimony was contained in the report delivered to plaintiff nine
days before the doctor testified.

Finally, the Court of Appeals

found that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate how he was
prejudiced, and absent prejudice and an adverse affect on the
substantial rights of the parties, any error in the admission of
evidence must be disregarded.
The petitioner's attempt to categorize this decision as a
crisis of procedure warranting certiorari is instead an attempt
to have this Court decide whether, under the facts of this case,
the lower court abused its discretion.

Such an appellate review

is case and fact specific and does not warrant certiorari.
In support of his contention that courts generally refuse to

allow surprise experts to testify in similar situations, the
petitioner cites the case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, 433 F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977).

In that case the

defendant in an airline decompression case called a doctor to
testify that petitioner's condition resulted from pre-existing
causes.

The plaintiff's counsel objected to the testimony on the

grounds that he had no prior notice of the witness and on the
grounds that the report furnished to him by the doctor did not
contain any diagnosis as to pre-existing causes.

The petitioner

in this case points out that the trial judge excluded the
testimony.
However, this exclusion by the trial judge was overruled on
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in the case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580
F.2d 1193 (1978).

In the appellate case, KLM asserted that the

district court erred in excluding this expert's medical
testimony.

In reviewing the issue on appeal, the Third Circuit

began by outlining the applicable standard of review and stated:
The applicable standard of review to
determine whether the district court abused
its discretion in excluding testimony for
failure to comply with pre-trial notice
requirements was recently stated by the court
in Meyers v. Penny Pack Woods, 559 F.2d 894
(3rd Cir. 1977). In that case, this court
reversed the district court's refusal to
admit testimony of a witness not named in a
pre-trial memoranda on the basis of four
factors:
1. the prejudice or surprise in fact of
the party against whom excluded witnesses
would have testified;

2. the ability of that party to cure
the prejudice;
3. the extent to which waiver of the
rule against calling unlisted witnesses would
disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of
the case or of other cases in the court;
4. bad faith or willfulness in failing
to comply with the court's order.'
Id. at 904. Additionally, we noted the
significance of the practical importance of
the evidence excluded. Id. at 905.
Examining the facts of this case in the light
of our standard of review, we hold that the
expert testimony should not have been
excluded. It may be that KLM did not perform
precisely to the pre-trial notice
requirements, and we are sensitive to the
district court's need to maintain control
over the discovery process and a fair,
orderly presentation of evidence. Yet,
exclusion of evidence is a drastic sanction,
v/hich must pass the strict Meyers test to be
upheld.
In the instant case, KLM's pleading and the
pre-trial order giving notice that
pre-existing medical infirmities would be
part of the case gives little support to
plaintiff's contention of surprise and
prejudice. And even if plaintiff's counsel
were surprised by who gave the testimony, he
should not have been surprised by its
substance. Further, Dr. Welch's testimony
occasioned no disruption in the trial, nor
was there any assertion that the defendant
exercised bad faith. In view of these facts,
and because of the critical importance of
this evidence to defendant's case, we are
constrained to hold that the district court's
exclusion of Dr. Welch's testimony as to
pre-existing medical infirmities was
reversible error.
Id. at 1201. (emphasis added and in original)
Applying these principals to the case currently before this
Court on Petition, not only is it clear that the lower court did

not abuse its discretion
Co-

-

"• • oeal s h a s i \- oi

'

e v i d e n t i a r y and p r o c e d u i IJ

.

outlined

-:r-"j«iv
tile

.-. r e p o r t
o"':''

days b e f o r e * , . ^ i u .
scenarir . * u
-Ie

;'* r e g a r d ! : ; J o u n , n s e
-)+-i .-P

. . ;

,

. the
•

:e

witnesses.

Dr.

nlaintiff
.

I

'

" - tr.e p l a i n t i f f

ie

which

ttsbt-imuiiy un cue u n n u aciy u i u n a i ,

nine

was +r t e s t i f y ,

fa^ual

p , , t i : y : ff had ^ c i c e

,

. -i. j

v.is d e J i v e r e d

o•

^n.^ *r^

' , , . _ > - :

pre-trial

*',!

,-

1^ ^ho p r e - 1 r i <]

Clark was i n c l u d e d
Lt1^

cle.i- -,.^4 * -•" d e c i s i o n

*

^i^wing the e n t i r e

t la^ - i . - I h r K w*o rr

testify

• ^ .

page / 3 oi :ns petition tna: :;: . Li^rK1* reappearance was
"obviously concealed from the petitionee , " *'here i s no evidence
to support sue!
defendants

*arp allegation n; „ _;

',o v *

-"

i: :)ad rai- ^

- .,"::, t: -, + ne

Vhe basis f *: . r. 'lar Vs

determinate LOI. m a t d-sp itt- ;.- . Onyeabo;- * s conduct, ;.-• was not In
personal risk,
F i i I a 1 ] '} „, t h e p e t :i t i o n e r s e e k s t :: I: i a v e t l:i i s C o I 11 t r e d e t • * r n i i n e
whether or i lot he was prejudiced by the testimony of Dr. Clark,
:e; t h^1 ^r^ri —

!i

'ha*- re wis prejudice b"

-r_ir. ic;- r \-

defendants' "allure

contention :;tv tne report tailed to state a

conclusion; and 4) inadequate cross examination.

Plain4-* 'f •;

arguments as to prejudice caused by the testimony o:. -,; . ,:iark
are unsubstantiated allegations and generalities.
petitioner's «.• - :- •

- * 'c:l re ss ji

The
• -- . * : : d

or how the outcome of the case was affected.

General statements

that evidence prejudiced a party are insufficient to establish
such a conclusion in the absence of a showing that the outcome of
the case was somehow affected thereby.
Thus, once again, viewing the facts surrounding the decision
on this issue in the lower court and the disposition of the issue
in the Court of Appeals, it is clear that this is an ordinary
case.

The decision by the Court of Appeals cannot be viewed as

drastically affecting established procedure and fairness in
ongoing litigation or even as a drastic departure from the rules
as they apply to this case.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 43 of

the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this issue does not
represent an issue of the character and scope necessary for
certiorari.

Therefore, the petition should be denied.
CONCLUSION

The issues presented by the plaintiff, when viewed in the
light of the facts in this case and the entirety of the decision
by the Court of Appeals, are not of the character and scope
necessary to grant certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.
Therefore the petition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

day of Ju

WlLtTTAM A. STEGAEir;
KIM M. LUHN
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Respondents
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ADDENDIJf I

EXHIBIT "A"
CONTROLLING STATUTES
1.

F

-uies 01 the Utah Supreme Court
Rule 4 3 ,

Considerations governing review of ce:i : t iorai: :i

Review by a writ of certiorari is not -\
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered:
(1) when a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another
panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state
or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this Courl:;
(3) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has
so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of
supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which
has not been, but should b e , settled by
this Court.
Pule f 1, :'tah Rules of

f

):! s •.'. . . •

I*-'L1

Procedure
. .•• i fi cat i on of a Judge.

disqualification. 'Whenever a party
to a:v;, j.jri'-n or proceeding, civil ••'" r

criminal, or his attorney shall make and file
an affidavit that the judge before whom such
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposite party to the suit, such judgment
shall proceed no further therein, except to
call in another judge to hear and determine
the matter.
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 26.

General provisions governing discovery.

(e) Supplementation of responses. A
party who has responded to a request for
discovery with a response that was complete
when made is under no duty to supplement his
response to include information thereafter
acquired, except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty
seasonably to supplement his response
with respect to any question directly
addressed to (A) the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of
discoverable matters, and (B) the
identity of each person expected to be
called as an expert witness at trial,
the subject matter on which he is
expected to testify, and the substance
of his testimony.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 59.

New trials; amendments of judgment.

(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following causes;

(3) Accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
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in

the

course of ruling on objections, or limiting the admissibility of
evidence or testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a
witness.

Instances falling within this category are Table 1 and

Appendix items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14.
For example, as to Appendix item 2 plaintiff asserts in his
Table I that the trial judge cast doubt on the validity of the
expert's testimony as to the value of lost future earnings by
referring to it as "pure speculation".

The context of the phrase

"pure speculation" was that plaintiff's counsel asked the witness
to calculate the plaintiff's lost future earnings by assuming
plaintiff would earn $6.00 per hour in the first year, $10.00 per
hour in the second year, $15.00 per hour in the third year and so
on to a level of $40,000 per year in the tenth year.

Defendants

objected that such incremental increases were without support in
the evidence.

In response to that objection, the court stated:

It seems to me it is pure speculation that in
the first year he is going to make $6.00 an
hour, in the next year $10.00 an hour and the
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is
pure speculation.
(T. K20).

Plaintiff also asserts with regard to Appendix item 2

that the trial court revealed his opinion of the plaintiff's
earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 an hour to
be received.

Again, referring to the transcript for the proper

context, while the trial court sustained the defendants'
objection with regard to assuming incremental increases in the
plaintiff's income as being unsupported by the evidence (T.
K21-22), the court did allow a calculation based upon $5.00 per
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of consciousness va? clearly too broad.
Q

|-By M r # Sykes]
What are some of the
gradations in loss of consciousness t;hat
might apply ho someone like Mr.
Onyeabor?
MR. STEGALL:

The. gradation:

Well, Your Honor, I think she answered
the question about what she was told,
and we're getting beyond - THE COURT:

Yes, I think so.

MR. STEGALL:
MR. SYKES:
gradation.

- - beyond that question.

Well, I just asked about the
Is that a —

THE COURT: You have had a witness here
that talked to him immediately after the
accident. And all she knows about
whether he experienced any
unconsciousness or not is what he told
her. She wasn't there, and she's talked
to him about it. And she — that's all
I'm going to let her testify to, as to
what — based upon what he told her, her
conclusion was as to whether or not he
did or did not lose consciousness.
MR. SYKES: Okay. I have no further
questions, Your Honor, of this witness.
(T. H28-31).
A review of the other Appendix items enumerated above (1-5,
7-11, 13 and 14) reveal that in the context of the questions, the
answers, the objections and the statements by the court with
regard to those objections, the trial court was not commenting
upon the evidence, but was, rather, ruling upon objections,
limiting evidence to which objections had been made, or
clarifying testimony which had been given.
In addition, to plaintiff's assertions that the trial court
commented on witness' testimony, plaintiff asserts in his Table I
that the trial court discredited documentary evidence by making
disparaging comments about the use of exhibit notebooks given to
jurors at the beginning of the trial and "severely scolded"

c o u n s e l in front of the jury

m1

(Appendix item P
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those e x h i b i t n o t e b o o k s by the trial c o u r t ,

Earli er in the day

durin-: • r. S o d e r b e r g ' s t e s t i m o n y , r e f e r e n c e w a s m a d e to e x h i b i t
number

J 4 , a w r i t t e n report of the C T e x a m i n a t i o n p e r f o r m e d on

the p l a i n t i f f .

The i n t e r c h a n g e b e t w e e n p l a i n t j ff's c o u n s e l w a s

MR. S Y K E S : Y o u r H o n o r , that is in the b o o k s .
And if it w o u l d be okay I'd like to h a v e the
jury turn to that for a m o m e n t .
J U D G E C R O F T : W e l l , the D o c t o r ' s t e l l i n g them
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t ' s i n it. I think they can
follow it. If they w a n t to look at i t it's
all r i g h t .

JUDGE CROFT: The trouble with them trying to
read what's in the exhibit is they might miss
the doctor's testimony. And that's what they
should hear.
(T. D325)
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Soderberg testified that he had
prescribed a cane for the plaintiff; the prescription was
received as exhibit number 52 and plaintiff's counsel stated:
MR. SYKES: I don't know if the jury has that
in their books. Could they check quickly?
JUDGE CROFT: Well, it is a prescription for
a cane. I don't think it's necessary that
they examine it, they will see it in the jury
room when they consider the case.
MR. SYKES:

Okay.

(T. D333)
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's counsel made a reference to
exhibit 16, which stated in its entirety:
Onyeabor today.

He has no health problems.

participate in all school activities."

"I examined Mr.
He should be able to

At that point, the

following interchange occurred:
MR. SYKES: Okay. If you could turn to
exhibit 16 again—and may the jury also, Your
Honor, turn to exhibit 16?
JUDGE CROFT:

If they wish.

(T. D348)
On redirect examination, Dr. Soderberg was asked to refer to
page one of exhibit 51, a four page office chart maintained by

Dr. Soderberg,

".:ai . plaintiff's counsel asked if the jury

could refei to the exhibit to which the trial judge replied:
JUDGE CROFT: If it's helpful. I don't know
that they need to look at the book every time
the Doctor says something about the exhibit,
JJ
'ill*- wi-n^ss following Dr. Soderberg was Dr. Gerald Moress.
ri

redirect examination the doctor w."is -vsked +~o identify an EMG
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exhibit, defendants1 counsel did object to the line of questions
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MR. SYKES: May we have tt'
that, Your Honor, to 5 5?
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JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you ask him the
question and I think the jury can get it
easier from what the doctor says than they
can trying to read what the book says. And
all of you follow what the doctor is saying
at the same time.
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the only reason I do
that, I think it would be helpful to see and
he a r at t he s ame t ime.
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an
understanding that any time the jury wants to
pick up the book to look at the exhibit that
the witness is talking about you are free to
do so, if you don't want to you don't have
to,
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be
• helpful in this case, Your Honor.
JUDGE CROFT: I'd.going to let them make the
decision because they may not find it that
way.

(T. D443-44)
It is obvious from this history of events that the trial
judge was concerned the use of the exhibit notebooks was becoming
distracting to the jury.

Nonetheless, after consulting with

counsel that evening and the following morning, the trial court
did advise the jurors that they should, at the request of
plaintiff's counsel, examine the exhibit being testified to. He
advised them that when the request was made, the jury was to look
at the exhibit being considered, and when that exhibit was no
longer needed, to close the exhibit book and not look through it
further as there might be exhibits that were not yet in evidence.
(T. E491)

That procedure was followed by the court for the

remainder of the trial.

If the jury somehow perceived the trial

judge's statements in controlling the use of the notebooks as
disparaging, any such perception was cured by his directions on
the morning of the fourth day of trial.
The remaining Appendix item (12) in which a claimed direct
comment was made occurred during the testimony of Patrick Chukwu.
Plaintiff states that the trial judge referred to a Nigerian
witness as "these young ones" thus demeaning the witness and
other younger Nigerians who had previously testified.

Mr. Chukwu

was the third of three friends testifying for plaintiff; these
witnesses were Emmanuel Uzoh, age thirty-one years, Robert Otti,
age thirty years and Mr. Chukwu, age thirty-two years. A review
of their testimony reveals that all three witnesses tended to
give lengthy narrative responses to specific questions.

For some
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By way of example, plaintiff asserts with respect to item 16
ln

Table II that the trial.court "interjects comment to help

defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness,"

The interchange in

question is as follows:
Q

[Mr. Stegall]
Were the test scores
helpful to him if he told you that he
was 580 and, in fact, was 563?

A

[Mr. Zelig]
I don't think there's a
significant difference between the two
scores. That's why I didn't pay too
much attention to it. I think it would
be an easy mistake to make, because they
were so close together.
THE COURT: That doesn't quite answer
his question, Doctor.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. It is not
significant to me that there was
significance in those two scores.

(T. G95)
Another such example is Appendix item 17 characterized by
plaintiff in Table II as the trial court interjecting to help
defense and questioning plaintiff's expert on the basis of the
expert's opinion.

The interchange in question is as follows:

Q

[By Mr. Stegall] Okay. What did Mr.
Onyeabor tell you about the jobs he
held?

A

[By Mr. Heal]
He described to me the
types of activities he performed in
Nigeria. In terms of estimating jobs or
working with customers, hiring workers,
training workers, securing materials and
equipment, and overseeing construction.

Q

You took those at face value?

A

I suppose. The other information I
relied on was - THE COURT:
Just answer the question.
Did you take them at face value? That
is the question.

(T. J187)
Substantially all of the remaining claimed comments are,
upon examination, revealed to be proper statements by the trial
judge to administer in orderly fashion evidence being introduced
at trial.
For example, Appendix item 15 is characterized by plaintiff
in Table II as the trial judge inviting defendants to object to
an expert's qualifications and casting doubt upon the expert's
qualifications.

A review of the transcript indicates that Dr.

Nielson testified very briefly concerning his professional
qualifications.

(T. D454)

In the interchange between the trial

judge and counsel complained of by plaintiff, the trial judge
clarified Dr. Nielson's qualifications to render opinion
testimony as follows:
JUDGE CROFT: I assume, Mr. Stegall, you are
not objecting to lack of qualification
testimony?
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, I understand the
gentleman is an ENT specialist a n d —
JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate he is an expert
in that field.

(T. D460)

MR. STEGALL:

in the field.

JUDGE CROFT:
foundation?

And can testify without further

MR. STEGALL:

In audiology, Your Honor.

JUDGE CROFT:

All right, go ahead, Mr. Sykes.

In Appendix item 19, plaintiff complains that the trial
judge made a rude interjection implying that plaintiff's counsel
had suggested an answer to the witness.

The transcript reveals

that plaintiff's counsel had asked a series of leading questions
with regard to the calculation of the present value of future
payments.

(T. K5-7)

The interchange between plaintiff's counsel

and Mr. Fjelsted preceding the court's statement is as follows:
Q

[By Mr. Sykes]
Okay. But just to
illustrate the principle of how you
arrive at that, what you are arriving at
is a discount rate?

A

[By Mr. Fjelsted]

Correct.

Q

Is that rate — and I indicated earlier
my example if you wanted to get $10,000
of income in ten years — in the tenth
year, let's say, and you want to know
how much money, now you need to produce
that, you have to apply a discount rate?

A

Correct.

Q

And that's why it is a lesser amount of
money?

A

That is correct.

Q

But you get that discount rate?
THE COURT: Are you asking him or
telling him, Mr. Sykes?
MR. SYKES: Well, you get that discount
rate by taking the interest rate here
minus —

(T. K8-9)

THE COURT:
it.

Let him tell you how he does

MR. SYKES:

All right.

Appendix item 24, is characterized by plaintiff as the trial
judge questioning one of plaintiff's experts as to whether he
understands certain head injury terms•

A review of the

transcript (T. E494-497) reveals the plaintiff was seeking the
admission of a video tape and a medical glossary.

The glossary

was to be used by the jury to look up medical terminology used
both in the video tape and by the witness.

The trial judge

suggested that the witness endeavor to use plain English in his
testimony rather than have the jury attempt to remember terms and
look up those terms in a glossary.

(T. E495-96)

The following

then occurred:
Q

[By Mr. Sykes]
Tell us about the film
— Who prepared it, when it was prepared
approximately and this sort of thing.

A

The film was prepared at the University
of Utah approximately, I'd say, about a
year ago or within the last year. It is
viewed predominently toward, for family
members or people that don't understand
brain injury and goes over, almost from
start to finish, of what happens. It
goes over all degrees of brain injury,
it describes it and some of the
consequences and what happens. And it
shows it very vividly. And I think it
is a high quality film. Unfortunately,
a couple places get a little technical
and that's my only problem with it, Your
Honor, in one area where they go over
the anatomy. There is a neuroanatomist,
Dr. Susan Stenson, who is excellent but
she uses all the big terms. And I'd be
glad to define any at that time if it is
necessary.
MR. SYKES:
JUDGE CROFT:
terms?

Perhaps —
Well you understand the

THE WITNESS:

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

JUDGE CROFT: If they need explaining
you can explain them to the jury, can't
you?
THE WITNESS:
(T. E495-97)

Yes, I can.

(Emphasis added).

Defendants1 objection to the

glossary was sustained; the video film was admitted over
defendants1 objection and was shown to the jury.

(T. E498-99)

From the context, it is evident the trial judge assumed the
witness was familiar with medical terminology and was clarifying
for the jury's benefit the fact the witness could help the jury
understand the video without resorting to a glossary.
Appendix item 25 is characterized by the plaintiff as the
trial judge questioning a plaintiff's expert about something
which "troubled" the trial court regarding the scope of a jury
decision to decide the case.

A review of the transcript reveals

that the court was properly troubled with regard to a statement
made by the witness which could have been perceived by the jury
as meaning the witness expected the jury to make a specific
finding in favor of plaintiff.

When asked about his opinion as

to whether the plaintiff had compensation syndrome, the following
interchange occurred:
A

(Dr. Nilsson)
Well, his — the majority
of my interactions have not been typical
of patients that I have followed who
have compensation syndrome in the sense
that he is more concerned that the truth
be shown, and that he is helped to be
more reassured of a good future, of
being able to care for his family. He
is very angry and he is very frustrated,

and sees a lot of the court proceeding
as an expression of that anger. But the
end result being a validation of yes,
you are injured and we will help you
with your problems.

[THE COURT:]
There was one comment
that the doctor made that troubled me
just a little bit, and that was that he
expected this court to make a decision
one way or another with respect to a
particular injury. Did I misunderstand
you, Doctor?
THE WITNESS: It is not my expectation,
Your Honor, no. But yet I think from my
experience, head injury patients in
general tend to see this as a final
confrontation of proof. In fact, I have
some patients who totally will verbalize
this court will say whether I have a
head injury or not. And obviously that
is not the case.
THE COURT: Your answer wasn't based
upon the assumption that this court or
the jury would make any determination on
that, I guess; is that right?
THE WITNESS:
(T. J38-39)

That's correct.

(Emphasis added.)

Appendix item 26 is characterized by plaintiff as the trial
court's interjection to unnecessarily restrict redirect
examination.

Dr. Duncan Wallace, a psychiatrist, had been

cross-examined by defendants with regard to the fact that Dr.
Wallace was himself a plaintiff in closed-head brain injury
litigation.

Dr. Linda Gummow, one of plaintiff Onyeabor's

witnesses, was also a witness in Dr. Wallace's litigation.

On

redirect examination, to rehabilitate Dr. Wallace, the witness

was asked to distinguish between his injury and that of Mr.
Onyeabor and was then asked about his own impairments.
Defendants1 objection was overruled.

The witness described his

impairments and difficulties for several pages of transcript

(T.

F742-44) at which point the complained of interchange occurred:
Q

(Mr. Sykes)
I.Q.?

Did you have a drop in

A

Probably had about a 10 to 12 point
drop.

Q

What was your I.Q. before the incident?
JUDGE CROFT: I think that's going a
little bit far on it, Mr. Sykes.
MR. SYKES: Wellf I would like to know
what his I.Q. is now because that does
relate to the type of report he may have
written here.
MR. STEGALL: I think that gets into a
lot of foundational questions we may not
be prepared to get into with this
witness. And —
MR. SYKES: I will withdraw the
question, it's not that important.
JUDGE CROFT: I think he's answered it
sufficiently.
MR. SYKES:

(T. F744-45)

Okay.

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff is complaining now of

testimony his counsel did not feel was important at trial.

The

witness had testified on direct as to his professional
qualifications (T.
impairments.

E650-52) and on redirect as to his own

Inquiry on redirect examination apparently aimed

solely at bolstering the witness' testimony was properly
terminated by the court.
Appendix item 27 is characterized by plaintiff as an
interjection by the trial judge to attempt to narrow the scope of
an answer by one of plaintiff's experts.

The transcript reveals

the witness was asked as to the number of his patients; the
question was ambiguous as to whether it referred to total
patients or brain injury patients.

The trial judge was

attempting to clarify that ambiguity.

(T. J8-9)

Appendix item 31 is characterized as the trial judge
"hassling" the witness as to the price of repair of his car's
left front tire. Two repair invoices (Exhibits 7 and 8) had just
been received without objection when the following occurred:
Q

(Mr. Sykes) Mr. Onyeabor, did you tell us
how much the amount of money was in the
tire -- I don't recall if you said that.
THE COURT: Well, the exhibit speaks for
itself. It is about $73,00.
MR. SYKES: Okay.

(T. I 102-03)

The trial judge was hardly "hassling" the witness

by properly noting that the exhibit just received spoke for
itself as to the amount of the tire repair.
Appendix item 32 is characterized as an interjection by the
trial judge because he didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to
testify about the fact he was hard of hearing.

The transcript

reveals that at the close of cross-examination of Mr. Pedersen,
plaintiff's father-in-law, plaintiff's counsel initially stated

he had no questions on redirect.

The trial judge excused the

witness at which point the following occurred:
MR. SYKES: I do have one other quick
question, if I might.
JUDGE CROFT:
MR. SYKES:
problem?

What is it?

Do you have a slight hearing

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. SYKES: How long have you had it?
JUDGE CROFT:

That doesn't matter.

THE WITNESS:

All my life.

JUDGE CROFT:

Just a moment.

MR. SYKES:
(T. D311-12)

That's all I have, Your Honor.

Notwithstanding the statement of plaintiff's

counsel that he had one other question, he attempted to ask
several which were clearly beyond the scope of cross-examination.
The trial judge was attempting to control questions and answers;
even so, the question was asked and answered.
Appendix item No. 33 is characterized by plaintiff as an
interruption by the trial judge to have evidence admitted before
plaintiff's counsel had finished laying the foundation therefor.
A review of the transcript (T. D476-77) reflects that plaintiff
was seeking the admission of three anatomical drawings (Exhibits
91, 92 and 93); the three exhibits were within the view of the
jury as Dr. Goka was asked to explain their relevance.

The trial

court properly suggested to counsel that the three exhibits be
placed into evidence so they could be considered by the jury.

All three exhibits were received without objection by defendants.
(T. D477)
Exhibit item 35 is characterized by plaintiff as an
unnecessary "scolding" of counsel on an evidentiary matter.

The

transcript reveals that plaintiff's counsel asked a number of
foundational questions with regard to certain medical reports.
(T. D455-56)

After having the witness identify the various

reports but before having them admitted into evidence,
plaintiff's counsel asked the witness the results of those tests.
At that point, the following interchange occurred:
JUDGE CROFT: Well, let's get the tests into
evidence first, Mr. Sykes.
MR. SYKES:
Honor.

I'd be happy to do that, Your

JUDGE CROFT: Well lets do it first. That's
the proper way to do them. Can you identify
those four reports by exhibit numbers?
(T. D456-57)

Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel had the various

reports marked and identified, all of which were received without
objection.

It is clearly evident that the trial judge was not

"scolding" counsel, but was properly requiring him to follow
appropriate procedures prior to questioning the witness
concerning the contents of the exhibits.
DEMEANOR OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Plaintiff contends he was prejudiced by reason of the
non-verbal conduct, including facial expressions, tone of voice,
sighs and body language of the trial judge.

Plaintiff made no objection during the course of the trial
to any non-verbal conduct of the trial judge; this claim was
raised by plaintiff for the first time in his motion for a new
trial.

An allegation of impropriety is not timely raised if it

is first presented as a post-trial motion.

State v. Barron, 465

S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971); Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535
P.2d 1095 at 1101 (1975).

In Barron, supra, the defendant in a

criminal trial asserted in his motion for new trial that during
the course of alibi testimony, the trial judge "placed his hands
flat to the side of his head, shook his head negatively once,
leaned back and swiveled his chair 180

around."

Noting that

such conduct was not revealed by the record and that there was no
other evidence of its occurrence save the verified motion for a
new trial, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated:
However, in any event, at the time appellant
asserts this incident occurred, no objection
was made and no relief was requested. The
alleged action of the trial judge, if it
occurred, would have the same effect as a
remark or comment by the trial judge, and the
rule is concisely stated in State v.
McCullough, 411 S.W.2d 79, 81 as follows:
If a party believes the remarks [by the
court] may prejudice his cause, he
should object immediately and afford the
court an opportunity to correct any
erroneous impression, and the issue is
not timely presented when raised for the
first time in a motion for a new trial.
An accused in a criminal case cannot
remain silent under the circumstances
which appellant asserts here occurred,
and thereby gamble on a favorable
verdict by permitting the trial to go to
conclusion without objection, and then
contend for the first time in a motion

for a new trial that reversible error
occurred. [citing cases.]
465 S.W.2d 523 at 528.
This same rule was followed by the Supreme Court of
Washington in Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash.
127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980).

In that case, the defendant

complained of "body language" by the trial court indicating
disbelief during the testimony of a number of defendant's
witnesses.

Although the Washington court's statements in this

regard are discussed by petitioner in his brief at pages 7-8, a
review of the entire statement by the court is necessary to
understand the import of that statement as it relates to
objections to the alleged misconduct.

The court's statement in

full is as follows:
While the report of proceedings does not
reflect contemporaneous objections to such
conduct, concurrent objection is not
required. Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wash. 2d
596, 598, 354 P.2d 928 (1960), concurring
opinion of Finley J. Understandably, counsel
may be reluctant to note such an objection,
particularly in the presence of the jury, and
may elect not to object at all if the
incidents are only occasional and minor. If,
however, the occurrences were as frequent and
marked as Crystal Mountain contends, counsel
should to object to the court's conduct.
Failure to object denies the trial court an
opportunity to mitigate the effect of its
conduct on the jury, when such conduct has
been inadvertent. Manifest error affecting a
constitutional right may, of course, be
raised at any time. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
Timeliness of objection is not an issue in
this case because the trial court was
sufficiently apprised of the matter in the
motion for mistrial. [The motion for new

trial was made approximately one-half way
through the trial].
606 P.2d at 1223 (emphasis added).
In this regard, petitioner complains of the trial court's
treatment of his exhibit notebooks.

As has been noted elsewhere

in defendants1 brief, the trial judge's statements were made to
control the use of the exhibit book which had some potential for
abuse. In any event, when the dissatisfaction of plaintiff's
counsel with the statement was called to the trial judge's
attention, the trial judge modified his earlier ruling with
regard to the use of the notebooks.

Thus, in the single instance

of which there is any indication that Plaintiff's counsel
objected to what he considered inappropriate conduct by the trial
court, the trial judge immediately took steps to rectify any harm
he may have done.
Neither before nor after the off-the-record conference which
occurred at the end of the third day of trial, did plaintiff's
counsel make any objections to comments, either verbal or
non-verbal, by the trial judge.
There is nothing in the record before this court which
identifies any specific instances of non-verbal conduct or which
specifically describes the conduct or which relates the conduct
to any event in the written record.

If such conduct was

perceived, plaintiff's counsel should have interposed a timely
objection thereto so that any perceived problem could be
rectified and an appropriate record made.

Instead, the plaintiff

first raised complaints concerning the trial judge's conduct in a
motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the specific instances of the comments by and the
conduct of the trial judge in the context in which made, there is
no support for plaintiff's contention that he was denied a fair
trial.

Instead, the comments were explanatory and for the

purpose of clarifying and limiting testimony to that which was
relevant to the issues before the jury.

The plaintiff's

contentions as to judicial bias were, therefore, without merit
and the Court of Appeals properly so held.

